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Long Arm Jurisdiction-TRANSACTING BUSINESS MEANS MINIMUM CONTACTS IN VIRGINIA-John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair, Inc.
Virginia's "long arm" statute1 is designed to increase the jurisdictional
power of this state so as to provide adequate redress in Virginia courts
against persons2 who inflict injuries upon or incur obligations to those in
whose welfare this state has a legitimate interest.3 Section 8-81.2 (a) (1) of

the Virginia Code vests the courts of this state with personal jurisdiction
over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action
arising from that person transacting any business in this state. 4 Recently
the Virginia Supreme Court has construed this section to provide Virginia's
courts with the maximum jurisdictional power now permissible under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5
In John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair, Inc.,6 the Virginia Supreme
Court rejected its "doing business" heritage 7 and employed the modem
iVA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1 to - 1.5 (Cum. Supp. 1971). With the exception of
paragraph 5 of Section 8-81.2, the power source of Virginia's "long arm" statute was
taken in toto from the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRocEDulRE Acr S 1.039B
U.L.A. (1966) which was approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1962. For a comprehensive note
on the Virginia "long arm" statute see Note, The Virginia "Long Arm" Statute, 51
VA. L. Rv. 719 (1965). For a list of "long arm" statutes enacted in other states
see2 Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 25 Coal,. J. 291 (1968).
1n the context of "long arm" jurisdiction, VA. CODE ANN. 5 8-81.1 (Cum. Supp.
1971) defines "person" as "an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal
representative, or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this State and whether or
not organized under the laws of this State."
3 Carmichael v. Snyder 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1968).
4

VA. CODE ANN. S 8-81.2(a)(1)

(Cum. Supp. 1971).

5The Virginia Supreme Court only twice before has been called upon to decide
controversies arising under Virginia's "long arm" statute since its enactment in 1964.
Neither case required the court to interpret the phrase "transacting business." See
Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 164 S.E.2d 703 (1968) which involved VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-81.2(a) (6) (Cum. Supp. 1971), and Walke v. Dallas, 209 Va. 32, 161 S.E.2d
722 (1968) wherein the court held that the "long arm" statute may be applied retroactively.
6 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971).
7 To circumvent the territorial power concept established by Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877) and to permit the extension of state in personam jurisdiction
beyond geographical boundaries, the fictional concepts of "implied consent" and
"presence" were developed. Later, activity within the forum state by corporate
agents was imputed to the corporation and if quantitatively sufficient was denominated
as "doing business" and was held to provide an adequate jurisdictional basis on the
theory of either implied consent or presence. H. HENN, LAW oF CoRORATioONs S 97,
at 151-52 (2d ed. 1970). For the purpose of judicial jurisdiction, "doing business"
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"minimum contacts" rule8 in order to find a sufficient transaction of busineant "the doing of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby reai zing
pecuniary profit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act for
such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts" RmsrAE.hiETr (SEcoND) oF CoN-rxicr OF LAWS § 47, Comment a (Proposed Official Draft,
May 23, 1969). The standard provided for a purely quantitative determination without
xegard to the burden on the defendant or the urgency of the need for adjudication
in the forum state. Developments In The Law, State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HAv. L.
REv. 909, 922-23 (1960).
Under the "doing business" test there further developed a distinction between "mere
solicitation" which provided no basis for "long arm" service and "solicitation plus"
which was deemed tantamount to "doing business.' Accordingly, most courts held
"that solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign corporation plus some
additional activities there are sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit
brought in the courts of the state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities
there." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314 (1945).
As to the extension of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations prior to the
enactment of its "long arm" statute, Virginia traditionally adhered to the conservative
"doing business" concept. See 1liff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.2d 360
(4th Cir. 1960); Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Wertz, 249 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1957);
Sikes v. Rexall Drug Co, 176 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Va. 1959); Carnegie v. Art Metal
Constr. Co, 191 Va. 136, 60 S.E.2d 17 (1950); Trignor v. L. G. Balfour & Co., 167
Va. 58, 187 S.E. 468 (1936). But cf. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp.,
307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Westcott-Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (4th
Cir. 1959); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949),
aff'd,
339 US. 643 (1950).
8
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) the United States
Supreme Court answered the demands of a commercially progressive and mobile
nation and abandoned the rigid "doing business" concept in favor of a more realistic
minimum contacts test. The defendant in International Shoe maintained no office or
stock in the forum state, made no contracts there, and made no delivery of goods in
interstate commerce; yet, the company was deemed to be transacting business in
that state and was held subject to its jurisdiction due to the systematic and continuous
solicitation of business by its in-state salesman. The Court rejected the concepts of
"presence" and "implied consent" and held that due process requires only that the
defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the state] . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" Id. at 316. Although the decision articulated no precise standards, the
Court did indicate that the test was not merely mechanical or qualitative, but
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure ...
[To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that
state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far
as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within
the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
Id. at 319.
For an in-depth analysis of the International Shoe doctrine and its subsequent
applications see Annot., 27 A..R.3d 397 (1969); H. HENN, LAw OF Con'oRATioNs
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ness in Virginia, thereby subjecting a California corporation to suit in this
state. The case involved an action for breach of contract against Chromodem Chair, Inc., a California manufacturer, brought by John G. Kolbe,
Inc., a Virginia corporation and an established non-stocking dealer for
Chromodern's products in Virginia. The cause of action arose from a single
sale of merchandise to Kolbe by the defendant, Chromodem, through a
Virginia based manufacturer's representative who secured a purchase order
from Kolbe in Virginia, calling for delivery to a remote purchaser in North
Carolina. Although Chromodem maintained no telephone, office facility, or
inventory in Virginia, it had actively solicited and secured the business of
other Virginia dealers in an attempt to develop a Chromodern market in
this state. 9 Accordingly, the court found that the defendant's activities
constituted a sufficient transaction of business in this state and further
found that the defendant had purposely availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within Virginia, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws.10 Therefore, the Virginia Supreme Court determined
that the existing minimum contacts were sufficient to satisfy the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment and held that the assertion of
jurisdiction by Virginia would not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 11
By defining the transacting business clause of Virginia's "long arm"
statute12 in terms of minimum contacts, the Kolbe court has endorsed
Virginia's legislative acceptance of the invitation issued by International
§§ 96-97 (2d ed. 1970); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533 (1963); Kurkland, The Supreme Court,
The Due Process Clause and the In Personam jurisdiction of State Courts From
Pennoyer to Denekla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958); Developments in the
Law, State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HAiv. L. REv. 909 (1960); Note, The Virginia "Long
Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719 (1965).
9 "On June 18, 1968, William Conklin, a manufacturer's representative, was appointed by Chromodern as its representative in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and all of Maryland except Baltimore and was authorized to name dealers in
his territory. From October 15, 1968, through April, 1969, Conklin sold Chromodem
merchandise to dealers in Norfolk and Roanoke amounting to $3,446.60,' 211 Va. at
737, 180 S.E.2d at 665.
'Old. at 741, 180 S.E.2d at 668.
11Id.
12In defining the transacting business clause, the Kolbe court concluded that,
"Section 8-81.2 (a) (1) discarded the concept of 'doing business' as the exclusive test
of jurisdiction and provided instead, insofar as pertinent here, that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident if, in person or through an agent, he transacts
any business in this State." 211 Va. at 740, 180 S.E.2d at 667. The modem majority
view is that the phrase referring to transaction of any business does not mean "doing
business" and requires considerably less contacts than those required under the
traditional doing business test. See Annot., 27 AJ.,.R.3d 397, 428 (1969).

,-1972]

RECENT DECISIONS

Shoe Co. v. Washington'3 to expand the jurisdictional basis of its courts.
The basic test of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
adopted by the Kolbe court is truly a realistic approach to the issue of state
jurisdiction over non-residents, but it is necessarily void of any precise or
definitive standards and indeed at first glance offers "no more basis for
judging than the highly amorphous and ultimately subjective standard of reasonableness." 14 However, the decision is not entirely wanting of direction.
The court defines the transacting business clause as a single-act statute,
requiring only one transaction in Virginia to confer jurisdiction on its
courts15 and further asserts that its application is bounded only by the
limitations imposed by the due process clause. 16 Fortunately, when viewed
in terms of constitutional limitations, Kolbe's seemingly recondite statutory
interpretation sheds some of its abstract quality and gains a certain degree of
functional significance.
At present the high-water mark in the United States Supreme Court's
expansion of the permissible scope of in personam jurisdiction over non'residents is McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.17 There, an assertion
of jurisdiction by the state of California was upheld although the only contact that a Texas insurer had with California was the mailing of an offer
of reinsurance to a California resident who accepted and thereafter mailed
the premiums on a single policy to Texas. In allowing jurisdiction based on
such an isolated transaction, the McGee court reasoned that, "It is sufficient
for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which has
substantial connection with that state." Is Subsequent to the McGee case,
the minimum contacts doctrine received its only significant limitation in
Hanson v. Denckla,19 wherein the Supreme Court, after noting the trend
134 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1 Southern Mach. Co. v. Mahasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
15 211 Va. at 740, 180 S.E.2d at 667.
16 As it had in Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 164 SE.2d 703 (1968), the Kolbe

court stated that, "It is manifest that the purpose of Virginia's long arm statute
is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in
this State to the extent permissible under the due process clause." 211 Va. at 740, 180
S.E.2d at 667.
17 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
18 Id. at 223. In dilineating this "substantial connection" the McGee court stated,

"The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there
and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that
California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." Id. The general applicability of
McGee will be considered in note 21 infra.
19 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Hanson case, in which jurisdiction was denied the
Florida court, involved an action against a Delaware corporation on a trust executed
in Delaware, brought by the settlor of the trust who had transferred her domicile
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toward expanding jurisdiction, 20 cautioned that to satisfy the requirements.
of due process ". . . it is essential in each case that there be some act by

which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 21 The Hanson court thus established the sine qua non
of valid "long arm" service under the transacting business clause to be the
purposeful engagement in activity within the forum state. Therefore, as.
developed by the United States Supreme 'Court, the present permissible
scope of due process permits the assertion of state jurisdiction on the basis
of a single transaction, 2 irrespective of the defendant's physical presence
within the forum state, so long as the cause of action arises out of or results
from the defendant's purposeful activity within the forum state 23 and the
from Pennsylvania to Florida and had there exercised her power of appointment
under the trust agreement. The defendant's only direct contact with the forum
state was its remittance of trust funds to the settlor in Florida.
20
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States,
the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At
the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the
defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these
changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, to the flexible
standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310. But it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Id. at 250-51.
21 357 U.S. at 253.
22 The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether a single contract
other than an insurance contract, or a single tort, is, as a matter of due process, a
sufficient basis to subject a nonresident to the in personam jurisdiction of a state
court. It has been argued that in view of Hanson, McGee should be regarded as a
special interest exception, applicable only to insurance contracts. However, a review
of the more recent decisions of the federal circuit courts indicates a unanimous
acceptance of McGee as a precedent of general applicability. See, e.g., O'Hare Int'l
Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco
Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 67
(8th Cir. 1963); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910, 913-14
(4th Cir. 1962).
The view that a single act may provide a sufficient basis for "long arm" service
was strengthened considerably by the opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in Rosenblatt
v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965) (in chambers on an application for a
stay pending appeal). Justice Goldberg pointed out that the logic of International
Shoe and McGee supports the due process validity of "single-tort" statutes and further
noted the general uniformity with which jurisdiction has been upheld on the basis
of a single tort. Further, it has been stated that although the United States Supreme
Court has not directly ruled on provisions of single act statutes which relate to
breach of warranty or tortious injury, it has left little doubt that such will be held
constitutional. Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. I (W.D. Va. 1965).
See Note, The Virginia "Long Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 727 (1965).
23 The actual physical presence of a nonresident within the forum state during
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assumption of jurisdiction is consonant with the due process tenants of fair
24
play and substantial justice.
Although the factual situation of Kolbe was pregnant with significant
contacts, 25 so as not to require a liberal application of the minimum contacts
rule, it is submitted that as applied to the transacting business clause, the
the commission of the act which gives rise to the cause of action sued on is indeed
an important factor, but in view of the combined effect of McGee and Hanson, it is
no longer controlling where the nonresident by his activity may be deemed to have
invoked the benefits and protections of the law of the forum. See Consolidated
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 1967). See
also Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golina, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967) (magazines sent into
state for sale by independent contractors); WSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242
(6th Cir. 1958) (transmission of radio broadcasts into forum state). But the mere
presence of a corporate agent in the forum state is not in itself a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction; the presence must be for the purpose of conducting business in the
state. See Blount v. Peerless Chemicals, Inc., 316 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963); KayeMartin v. Brooks, 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959).
24 In L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 773 n. 12
(9th Cir. 1959) the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated three basic rules
to be drawn from a combined reading of the International Shoe, McGee, and Hanson
decisions:
1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within the forum. It is not necessary that defendant's agent be physically
within the forum, for this act or transaction may be by mail only. A single
event will suffice if its effects within the state are substantial enough to qualify
under Rule Three.
2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results from, the
activities of the defendant within the forum. It is conceivable that the actual
cause of action might come to fruition in another state, but because of the
activities of defendant in the forum state there would still be a "substantial
minimum contact!'
3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum contact between
the defendant and the state, the assumption of jurisdiction based upon such
contact must be consonant with the due process tenents of "fair play" and
"substantial justice." If this test is fulfilled, there exists a "substantial minimum
contact" between the forum and the defendant. The reasonableness of subjecting
the defendant to jurisdiction under this rule is frequently tested by standards
analogous to those of forum non convenens.
See also Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.
1968); State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 448 P.2d 571, 574 (Ore.
1968).
25 The facts of the Kolbe case reveal that the cause of action arose from a written
obligation secured in Virginia from the plaintiff by the defendants agent while
physically present within the state. Prior to securing such obligation, the defendant
through his agent had actively solicited the business of the plaintiff and established
the plaintiff as a non-stocking Virginia dealer. Further, the facts reveal transactions
with other Virginia dealers which, when considered with the sale to the plaintiff,
delineate a pattern of activities intended to develop the defendant's market in Virginia
and to reap economic benefit therefrom. 211 Va. at 741, 180 S.E.2d at 668.
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Kolbe decision provides authority for expanding the jurisdiction of Virginia's
courts to utilize fully the increased jurisdictional power created by the
trilogy of International Shoe, McGee and Hanson.26 Accordingly, where
the requisite purposeful activity in Virginia is present, and the assertion of
personal jurisdiction is not violative of the constitutional standard of general
fairness to the defendant, the statute, being remedial in nature, 27 should
be applied liberally 28 in the context of "modem day commercial and personal accelerated relationships." 29 The non-resident defendant "should not
be in the position, even though indirectly, to enjoy the fruit but disavow
the situs of the tree from which the fruit was derived." 30
By interpreting the transacting business clause of Virginia's "long arm"
statute in terms of a realistic and flexible rule based on the now accepted
standards of due process, 31 the Kolbe court not only has clarified an important area of Virginia law but has further empowered the courts of this
26

In effect, the Kolbe decision emasculated the "doing business" concept in Virginia
and established "transacting business" as the determinant standard governing the
extension of "long arm" jurisdiction under VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2 (a) (1) (Cum.
Supp. 1971). It secondly defined "transacting business" in terms of the modern
minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe and its subsequent extensions and modifications in McGee and Hanson. Lastly, the Kolbe decision reiterated that the purpose
of Virginia's "long arm" statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage
in some purposeful activity in this state to the extent permissible under the due
process clause. 211 Va. at 740-41, 180 S.E.2d at 667-68.
27 "The Virginia long arm statutes are remedial only and do not disturb vested
rights or create new obligations; they merely supply a remedy to enforce an existing
right." Walke v. Dallas, Inc., 209 Va. 32, 35, 161 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1968).
28 "Protection of life and property within its boundaries is a primary concern of
state government, and each state has a vital interest in providing a forum for actions
that arise both from torts committed, and out of contracts entered into, within its
borders." Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 455, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1968). Virginia
enacted its "long arm" legislation for the expressed purpose of exercising its manifest
interest in providing effective redress for its citizens. Therefore, within the permissible
scope of due process, such legislation should be interpreted and applied liberally
as a remedy to enforce the existing rights of Virginia's citizens.
29 O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1971).
The test of whether business was transacted within the state must be applied
in the context, not of communication and transportation criteria of yesteryears,
but of modern day commercial and personal accelerated relationships. The long
arm statutes are comrades of the computer. Id.
30 Id.
31 Prior to the Kolbe decision, the federal district courts applying Virginia's "long
arm" statute to extend their own jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, anticipated
the Virginia Supreme Court's adoption of the "minimum contacts" standard and
interpreted the statute accordingly. See Dotson v. Kwiki Systems, Inc., 281 F. Supp.
874 (W.D. Va. 1968); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Molins Organizations, Ltd,
261 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Va. 1966); Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co, 249 F. Supp. 1
(W.D. Va. 1965); Jackson v. National Linen Serv., 248 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Va. 1965).
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increasingly mobile and commercially progressive state to provide Virginia's
citizens with the full protection of the law. The minimum contacts theory
excludes a mechanical approach whereby a single factor may be permitted
controlling significance and requires in each case that jurisdiction be granted
or denied on the basis of a careful balancing of all the factors, equities and
cbnveniences. Therefore, in order to realize the full protection of the transacting business section and indeed the entire "long arm" statute, it is essential that courts and practitioners be aware of and sensitive to all of the
facts surrounding the transaction giving rise to the cause sued upon. 32 Such
diligent application of the Kolhe decision will indeed provide realistic protection for the citizens of this state as well as a reliable degree of predictability in the development of Virginia's "long arm" jurisprudence.
1. F., III

32 As noted by the Kolbe court, "the divergence of judicial opinions demonstrates
that the holding in each case must rest upon an analysis of its own particular facts
and circumstances." 211 Va. at 740, 180 S.E.2d at 667. For a survey of current state
and federal decisions see Annot., 27 AL.R.3d 397 (1969).

